\u3cem\u3eBrinkman v. Brinkman\u3c/em\u3e: Where Res Judicata Has Gone too Far by Griffin, Rebekah B.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 5
3-1-1999
Brinkman v. Brinkman: Where Res Judicata Has
Gone too Far
Rebekah B. Griffin
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Family Law Commons
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rebekah B. Griffin, Brinkman v. Brinkman: Where Res Judicata Has Gone too Far, 13 BYU J. Pub. L. 379 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol13/iss2/5
Brinkman v. Brinkman: Where Res Judicata 
Has Gone too Far* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Domestic violence is frequently a cause of divorce actions. According 
to one study, "up to 80% of wives suing for divorce cite physical abuse by 
their husbands. " 1 However, in domestic violence situations, very few 
women pursue any actions against their husbands beyond a divorce. 2 There 
are several reasons that a woman may not want to pursue a legal claim 
against her husband. First, the wife may not even realize she is a victim of 
domestic violence. 3 If she does realize her husband has been physically or 
emotionally abusive, she may not want to tell her attorney about the do-
mestic violence4 for fear that her husband might harm her or her children if 
she tells her attorney.' Thus, since the attorney does not know about the 
abuse they do not consider pursuing a tort claim. Second, if the wife does 
tell her attorney about the abuse, pursuing a tort claim may not be her top 
priority. 6 She may be more concerned about ending the abuse and obtain-
ing custody of her children, and she might feel that pursuing a tort claim 
will aggravate her husband and thus jeopardize her goals. 7 
If the wife does overcome these concerns and is brave enough to pur-
sue a tort claim, she may still face several legal barriers. Most women will 
not be prevented from bringing the claim because of interspousal tort im-
munity, although Georgia is "still hanging on stubbornly to [it's] 
immunit[y]."8 More commonly, a spouse may have problems of proof es-
pecially if there are no other witnesses to the domestic violence, or she 
may be precluded from bringing her claims by the statute of limitations. 
Copyright© 1999 by Rebekah B. Griffin. 
I. Brennan v. Orban. 678 A.2d 667, 675 (N.J. 1996) (citing Linda L Ammons, 
DIScretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor's Use ol the Clemency Power in 
the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L & PoL'Y I, 5 (1994)). 
2. See Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and 
Possibilities. ~I NEW ENG. L REv. 319 n.20 ( 1997) "Among approximately 2600 reported state 
cases of battery assault, or both, from In I through 1990, only fifty-three involved adult parties in 
domestic relationships." !d. at n.20. 
3. See Barbara Glesner Fines, Joinder ol7im Claims in Divorce Actions, 12 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. L 285, 301-302 (1994). 
4. See Dalton, supra note 2, at 351, 364-371. 
5. See id. at 364-69. 
6 See Fines, supra note 3, at 30 I. 
7. See Dalton, mpra note 2, at 364-71. 
8. !d. at 324. See also New v. Hubbard, 426 S.E.2d 379 (Ga Ct. App. 1992). 
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Further, if the wife decides to pursue her tort claims after the divorce pro-
ceeding, her tort claim may be barred based on principles of res judicata.9 
This is precisely what happened in Brinkman v. Brinkman. 10 
This note first looks at the background of applying res judicata to tort 
claims after divorce proceedings and specifically looks at the standards set 
forth in Twyman v. Twyman, 11 the predecessor to Brinkman. Second, it 
examines the facts and the reasoning of Brinkman. Third, this note ana-
lyzes the reasoning of Brinkman and the potential problems that will fol-
low its decision. Fourth, this note discusses an alternative, and perhaps 
better holding than the one made in Brinkman. Fifth, this note shows how 
this better holding could still further the policies of the Brinkman decision. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Courts have had a difficult time handling tort claims either during or 
after divorce. Some courts have held that tort and divorce claims must be 
tried separately because trying them together can both complicate and ex-
tend the litigation. 12 However, many courts have been reluctant to allow a 
tort claim after a divorce proceeding and have dismissed tmt claims based 
on principles of res judicata13 in order to end litigation, promote judicial 
economy, and prevent subjecting defendants to litigation on the same sub-
ject twice. 14 Other courts have tried to give the plaintiff spouse a little 
more flexibility and have made joinder of the claims perrnissive. 15 This is 
what the Texas Supreme Court tried to do in Twyman v. Twyman, 16 the 
predecessor to Brinkman. 17 
In Twyman v. Twyman, the plaintiff, Shelia Tyman filed for divorce in 
1985. 18 She later amended her petition and alleged that her husband "in-
tentionally and cruelly attempted to engage her in deviate [sic] sexual 
acts."19 The trial court, after dividing the marital property, awarded Shelia 
9. See. e.g., Wei! v. Lammon, 503 So. 2d 830, 832 (Ala. 1987); Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 
1189, 1196 (N.J. 1979). Black's Law Dictionary defines res judicata as "conclusive of rights of 
parties or their privies in all1ater suits on points and matters determined in former suit." BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (4th ed. 1968). 
10. 966 S.W.2d 780 (Tex Ct. App. 1998). 
II. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) 
12. See, e.g., Windauer v. O'Connor, 485 P.2d 1157 (Ariz. 1971); Simmons v. Simmons, 773 
P 2d 602, 604 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985). 
13. See, e.g., Wei! v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830, 832 (Ala. 1987); Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 
1189, 1196 (N.J. 1979). 
14. See Brinkman v. Brinkman, 966 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) 
15. See Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 619. 
16. !d. 
17. 966 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). 
18. See Twyman 855 S.W.2d at 620. 
19. !d. 
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$15,000 in damages for emotional distress. 20 On appeal, one of the issues 
the Texas Supreme Court considered was whether an action for intentional 
emotional distress could be brought in a divorce proceeding. 21 Some courts 
have held that the tort issues and divorce issues must be litigated sepa-
rately while other courts have required joinder of all of the causes of ac-
tion.22 The Texas Supreme Court then stated that "the best approach lies 
between these two extremes.'m It held that joinder of tort and divorce ac-
tions were permitted, but that if the actions were not joined, the later action 
could be barred on principles of res judicata.24 The court speculated that 
most tort actions and divorce petitions would be joined together and that 
only in certain cases would the facts supporting a tort action be different 
than the facts supporting a divorce petition. 25 Although Twyman's holding 
seemed to help the victim of domestic violence by making joinder of tort 
and divorce claims permissive and not mandatory, its holding was severely 
limited. Brinkman exposed just how limited the holding was. 
Ill. BRINKMAN V. BRINKMAN 
A. The Facts 
On May 29, 1993, Leta Jane Brinkman and Lloyd Brinkman were 
married. 26 Mr. Brinkman physically assaulted Ms. Brinkman on November 
18, 1993_27 The assault caused permanent damages to two discs in Ms. 
Brinkman's neck. 28 
Approximately one year later, Mr. Brinkman filed for divorce. 29 Ms. 
Brinkman countersued for divorce and alleged fraud, breach of fiduciary 
duty, and constructive trust relating to Mr. Brinkman's actions involving 
their community property. 30 Ms. Brinkman also alleged that the "marriage 
was insupportable because of, ... cruel treatment toward Ms. Brinkman by 
Mr. Brinkman."31 Because Ms. Brinkman was still suffering from injuries 
inflicted by Mr. Brinkman in 1993, she also made a motion for temporary 
spousal support to help cover the costs of her medical and physical therapy 
20. See id. Sheila had experienced "physical problems, weight loss and, after one encounter, 
prolonged bleeding that necessitated gynecological treatment. The pain and humiliation of the bondage 
activity caused her to seek help from three professional counselors." /d. at 641. 
21. See id. at 624. 
22. See id. 
23 !d. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. at 624-625 n.l7. 
26. Brinkman v. Brinkman, 966 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. at 781. 
31. !d. at 782. 
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treatments. 32 Last of all, Ms. Brinkman sought an injunction prohibiting 
Mr. Brinkman from causing her further bodily injury. 33 
Mr. Brinkman then "moved to sever the divorce and property division 
issues from Ms. Brinkman's tort causes of action" for fraud, breach of fi-
duciary duty, and constructive trust. 34 Mr. Brinkman claimed that the tort 
claims were not necessary to the divorce, and the court granted his mo-
tion.35 The trial court then "entered judgment on the divorce and property 
division issues based upon a prenuptial agreement ... signed by both par-
ties. '>36 After the judgment, both Mr. and Mrs. Brinkman filed a joint Mo-
tion to Set Aside the Order of Severance and Decree of Divorce.37 The di-
vorce action was then joined with the fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
constructive trust claims.38 Finally, the parties entered into an Agreed 
Amended Decree of Divorce, resolving both the divorce and the fraud, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive trust claims. 39 
Ms. Brinkman later filed a personal injury claim against Mr. 
Brinkman40 for the assault in 1993. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment holding that Ms. Brinkman's claims were barred based on principles 
of res judicata. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment.41 
B. The Court's Reasoning 
The Texas Court of Appeals cited Twyman42 which held that joinder of 
tort claims and divorce claims were not mandatory.43 However, the appeals 
court also noted that the Twyman court stated that where tort claims were 
brought after the resolution of the divorce matter, the principles of res judi-
cata would remain applicable.44 The appeals court applied Texas' res judi-
cata standard to determine whether Ms. Brinkman could bring her tort 
claims against Mr. Brinkman.45 The standard the Texas Supreme Court 
32. See id. at 780. 
33. See id. at 781. 
34. !d. at 781 
35. See id. 
36. !d. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. 
39. See id 
40. Ms. Brinkman also sued Mr. Brinkman's employer, Mr. Gatti's Inc. under the theory that 
Mr. Brinkman was "acting in the court and scope of his employment with Mr. Gatti's, Inc. when 
the assault occurred." !d. at 781 n.2. However, since this is not relevant to this casenote, the two 
parties will be collectively referred to as Mr. Brinkman. 
41. See id. at 783. 
42. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619. 
43. Brinkman, 966 S.W.2d at 782. 
44. See id 
45. See id. 
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had previously adopted was similar to the Restatement [Second] of Judg-
ments, which required that a final judgment in an action extinguish the 
right to bring suit on "the transaction, or series of connected transactions, 
out of which the action arose."46 The court reasoned that this standard was 
necessary to "prevent vexatious litigation, maintain stability of court deci-
sions, prevent double recovery, and promote judicial economy."47 
The court then examined the facts alleged in both the tort claim and 
the divorce claims of Ms. Brinkman. It concluded that because Ms. 
Brinkman had alleged cruel treatment by Mr. Brinkman in the divorce 
action,48 because Ms. Brinkman had requested a disproportionate share of 
the community property in the divorce,49 and because Mrs. Brinkman had 
made a motion for temporary orders for spousal support and was later 
cross-examined about the medical treatment she received as a result of Mr. 
Brinkman's assault,50 "she was bound to assert all of her claims for cruel 
treatment arising out of the divorce at the time of the divorce."51 She could 
not now use the facts related with Mr. Brinkman's assault and her injuries 
resulting from it to support a tort claim because she had used the same 
facts in the divorce proceeding. 52 The court further reasoned that if it al-
lowed Ms. Brinkman's tort claim, it would enable a spouse to get double 
recovery. 53 A spouse could receive a disproportionate share of property in 
the divorce proceeding by alleging spousal abuse and then recover com-
pensatory and punitive damages through a tort claim for spousal abuse. 54 
The Brinkman court concludes stating that "requiring joinder under 
these facts is consistent with the purposes of res judicata."55 The court fi-
nally stated that if joinder would have been too difficult, then "the proper 
remedy would have been severance, not the filing of a second suit after the 
first had been resolved."56 
IV. ANALYSIS OF BRINKMAN V. BRINKMAN 
The court suggested a few other alternatives that would have 
prevented Ms. Brinkman's tort claim from being barred based on princi-
ples of res judicata. First, it implied that if Ms. Brinkman had not brought 
46. See ld. (citing Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex 1992) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS~ 24(1) (1982))). 
47. Brinkman, 966 S.W.2d at 782. 
48. See id. 
49. See id. at 782-783. 
50. See id. at 783. 
51. !d. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
55. !d. 
56. !d. 
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up Mr. Brinkman's physical assault in the divorce proceeding, then she 
would have been able to bring her tort claim. Second, the court suggested 
that Ms. Brinkman could have joined the claims. Third, and finally, the 
court suggested that if joinder of the claims would be too complicated, the 
claims could be severed. However, none of these suggestions are very real-
istic alternatives in that each has a definite shortcoming. 
To the suggestion made by the court that the claim be severed, res ju-
dicata will still bar the tort action if the divorce proceedings are settled be-
fore the tort claim. Given the legal and extended nature of a tort claim, this 
result is quite likely. The standard that the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments sets out is that "final judgment on an action extinguishes the right to 
bring suit on the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of 
which the action arose."57 Thus, Ms. Brinkman would lose her right to pro-
ceed with her tort claim as soon as the divorce proceedings were finalized 
even if she brought the tort claim at the same time as she brought the di-
vorce claim. 
The first implied suggestion, that if Ms. Brinkman had not brought up 
physical assault in the divorce proceeding, then she would have been able 
to bring her tort claim, is also problematic. In cases of domestic violence 
or spousal abuse, this may not be a very realistic option. In the Brinkman 
case, the court was concerned that Mr. Brinkman would have to pay Ms. 
Brinkman twice for the same injury he caused her. 58 However, in many 
cases, the wife may have motives other than pecuniary advantage for 
bringing up her husband's abusive history. 
First, in Brinkman, Ms. Brinkman needed temporary spousal support 
during the divorce proceedings to help pay for her medical and physical 
therapy expenses.59 It seems unfair that if she brings up the spousal abuse 
in the divorce to cover her necessary medical expenses during the divorce, 
she must bring up all of her possible tort claims simultaneously. 
Second, Ms. Brinkman needed to seek an injunction preventing her 
spouse from further injuring her.60 Ms. Brinkman probably felt that this 
injunction was necessary for her safety and protection. Again it does not 
seem fair that if a wife's primary purpose in bringing up spousal abuse is 
to protect herself, she must bring up all of her possible tort claims simulta-
neously. 
Finally, a potential problem not even addressed in the Brinkman facts 
occurs when the couple has children. Tort issues will most likely be very 
relevant in divorce cases where child custody issues are involved. If the 
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982). 
58. See Brinkman, 966 S.W.2d at 783. 
59. See id. at 780. 
60. See id. at 781. 
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wife or children have been victims of sexual or physical abuse by the 
husband, then the wife may want to bring up these facts in the divorce pro-
ceeding to help her gain custody of the children. The wife may also need 
to further protect her children if the husband has visitation rights either 
during or after the divorce proceeding. By bringing up his past abuse, she 
may be able to insure that the visits are supervised and preclude any fur-
ther injury to her children. 
Thus, if any of these reasons are the spouse's primary motives for 
bringing up past abuse, it would seem unfair to force joinder of her divorce 
proceedings and any potential tort claims. In different situations a wife 
may want to pursue her tort claims during the divorce proceeding, but in 
many instances she may choose not to pursue the claim at all if she must 
do it during the divorce. 
The final suggestion that the court makes is that Ms. Brinkman could 
have joined the tort and divorce claims. However, this will not be a good 
option for potential plaintiffs who want to bring tort actions against their 
husbands. 
There are many reasons why a woman may not want to bring up tort 
claims in a divorce proceeding. First, the wife, who may not have suffi-
cient funds to pay an attorney, may want to pay a contingency fee to her 
lawyer to pursue her tort claim. 61 Because spousal abuse is very "acute 
among poor women,"62 contingency fees may play a crucial role in even 
allowing many women to pursue tort claims. However, the same lawyer 
may run into ethical problems if she represents her client in both the tort 
and domestic issues. The Model Rules do not allow a lawyer to charge a 
fee in a domestic relations matter that is "contingent upon the securing of a 
divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement 
in lieu thereof; ... "63 Practically, however, separating the claims may be 
difficult for the attorney if both cases are interrelated. Due to the potential 
ethical problems, it's likely that the attorney will prefer charging for all of 
her work on a per hour basis which could disadvantage a client that is indi-
gent. Even if the client chooses to hire separate attorneys for her divorce 
and tort actions, things could get tricky if she decides to settle on both 
claims as the tort attorney may have a hard time determining his contin-
gency fee. This may prevent tort attorneys from accepting a case if the di-
vorce is not yet final. 
61 See Fines, Sllf>rll note 3 at 299-300. 
62. Brennan v. Orban, 6n A.2d 667, 675 (N.J. 1996) (stating that in Washington, 60% of 
women on public assistance reported sexual and physical abuse as adults, usually by a spouse or 
boyfriend). See also Fines, supra note 3 at 299 (citing Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham, 
Protecting Women "s We/j(ue in the Face of Violence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141, 1145 ( 1995)). 
63. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (d)(l} (1997). 
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The second reason why a woman may not want to bring up a tort claim 
after a divorce proceeding, a reason not mentioned by the Brinkman court, 
is what will be done if a woman demands a jury trial for her tort claim. 
Under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, the right 
to a jury trial is preserved "as it existed at common law in 1791."64 Al-
though the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states, most states 
have adopted a state constitutional guarantee analogous to the Seventh 
Amendment.65 However, because divorce actions are equitable, a judge 
typically hears the matter. 66 Thus, if both the divorce claims and tort claims 
are joined and the wife demands a jury trial for her tort claim, the question 
arises, "Who should hear the claims: a jury or a judge?" Two different so-
lutions have been suggested for this scenario: "(I) Try the tort claim before 
a jury first, then incorporate its factual findings and damage award in the 
judge's divorce decree; (2) have both the tort and divorce claims decided 
by a judge."67 Neither one of these, however, are very hopeful solutions. 
The first solution requires the parties to wait until the tort claim is adjudi-
cated before they can settle the divorce. This may not be a very realistic 
option since tort claims can have a long adjudication period and more 
pressing issues, such as child custody issues may have to wait. It may also 
be economically infeasible for the dependent spouse to wait for the tort 
claim to be adjudicated. The second solution, having a judge decide both 
matters, may raise some state constitutional issues if the parties do not 
have the right to a jury trial. A possible third solution, letting the jury de-
cide both claims, is also unrealistic because distributing martial property 
"often requires complex accounting of the parties' mutual claims against 
each other." 
The abused spouse also may not have a fair opportunity of pursuing 
her tort claim to the fullest extent if her spouse still has considerable lever-
age during the divorce proceeding. Her spouse could threaten to fight for 
full custody of the children or perhaps even threaten her with physical 
harm. 6R He may also threaten to fight more aggressively for the marital as-
sets. Whether or not these threats are reasonable, the spouse, just coming 
out of an abusive relationship, may feel sufficiently intimidated to decide 
not to pursue the action. 
Even if the husband does not threaten his spouse, it is unlikely that the 
wife will be able to pursue her tort claim to the fullest extent during the 
divorce proceeding. Negotiations for settlement might be protracted or 
64. Andrew Schepanl, Dmmt', fnterspousal Torts, and Res Judicata, 24 FAM. L.Q. 127. 149 
ti'NO) 
65. See id. 
66. See id. at 149-150. 
67 See id. at 150. 
68 See Dalton, supra note 4, at 364-371. 
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more strained. The wife may feel pressure to back down on her claim in 
order to receive more custody of the children or more marital assets. In 
dropping her claim, she may not realize how potentially valuable it is. 
Additionally, divorce can be a very emotionally draining time for the 
battered wife, and she may not be able to see her opportunities clearly. She 
may not be fully aware how extensively her spouse has abused her and 
what remedies she has against him.69 She may blame her experience on her 
own inadequacies, rather than his behavior, the psychological and emo-
tional damage from her spouse may temporarily prevent her understanding 
how egregious her spouse's behavior was. Although some of the abuse 
may arise in the divorce proceeding, her full awareness of the extent of the 
abuse may not come until after the divorce proceeding. If her tort claims 
are barred, she will never get the remedy she deserves for her spouse's be-
havior. 
Finally the tort claim may be minimized in the divorce proceeding. 
Although spousal abuse is one of the factors the Texas court takes into ac-
count in determining the distribution of marital assets,70 the abuse allega-
tion may get lost in other factors that determine how property is to be di-
vided. This is because the "distribution and support decisions may legiti-
mately be made on the basis of such an array of 'factors,' that the abuser 
never pays the bill associated with his abuse."71 
V. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE 
Before states started to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 
states focused more on the nature of the claims in determining where the 
second claim would be barred based on principles of res judicata.72 Thus 
divorce claims and tort actions could easily be distinguished: tort actions 
are legal in nature while divorce claims are equitable. Thus, because the 
nature of the claims are different, res judicata could not bar the second tort 
claim.73 Many states still use this reasoning in allowing a tort claim.74 
69. See Fines. supra note 3, at 301-302. 
70. See Twyman v. Twyman. 855 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex. 1993) It is easy to see how the 
abuse may not be given full attention when considered with all these other factors which are: "the 
spouses· capacities and abilities. benefits which the party not at fault would have derived from 
continuation of the marriage, business opportunities. education. relative physical conditions. relative 
financial condition and obligations. disparity of ages. size of separate estates, and the nature to the 
property." I d. at 625. 
71. See Dalton. supra note 4. at 389. 
72. See generally. Schepard. supra note 64. 
73. See. e.g .. Lord v. Shaw. 665 P 2d 1288. 1291 (Utah 1983) 
74. See. e.g .. Windauer v. O'Connor, 485 P.2d 1157. 1157-1158 (Ariz. 1977) (en bane); 
Simmons v. S1mmons. 773 P 2d 602; (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Vance v. Chandler. 597 N.E.2d 233 
(Ill App Ct. I 992) 
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However, as more and more states adopt the Restatement [Second] of 
Judgments, the preclusive effect is broadening. Thus, as more states adopt 
the Restatement, we may expect to see a trend towards barring tort claims. 
However, a few states have managed to adopt the Restatement and still 
allow tort claims after divorce proceedings.75 Alaska has successfully rec-
onciled the two competing principles in the case, Nelson v. Jones. 7~ The 
analysis of this court could have easily been used by the Texas Court of 
Appeals to allows Ms. Brinkman her tort claim. 
In Nelson v. Jones, Jones accused Nelson of sexually abusing their 
daughter.77 Nelson was arrested and charged with second-degree sexual 
abuse of a minor. 78 All charges were dropped. The parties then divorced. 
Nelson then sued Jones for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and 
defamation based on the sexual abuse charges she had filed. 79 The issue 
before the court was whether Nelson was barred from bringing these tort 
claims against his ex-wife when they were not brought up in the divorce 
proceeding. 80 Supreme Court quoted the second Restatement stating, "The 
claims extinguished by the first judgment include 'all rights of the plaintiff 
to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the 
transaction ... out of which the action arose. "'81 However, the court then 
decided that it would be "inappropriate to require tort actions between 
married persons to be litigated in the divorce proceeding."82 The court did 
not directly reconcile their decision with the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments but simply stated, "There are considerations unique to cases 
such as this which compel us to acknowledge a narrow exception to our 
traditional interpretation of the doctrine of res judicata. "83 
The court then cited to a Wisconsin case for justifying its exception: 
Divorce actions will become unduly complicated if tort claims 
must be litigated in the same action .... Resolution of tort claims 
may necessarily involve numerous witnesses and other parties 
such as joint tortfeasors and insurance carries whose interests are 
at stake. Consequently, requiring joinder of tort claims in a di-
vorce action could unduly lengthen the period of time before a 
75. See Aubert v. Aubert, 529 A.2d 909 (N.H. 1987). 
76. 787 P 2d I 031 (Alaska 1990) 
77. See id at I 032. 
78. See id. 
79. !d. 
80. Ser id at I 033 
80. !d. (citing State v. Smith. 720 P 2d 40,41 (Alaska 1986)) 
82. /d. at I 034. 
83. !d. (citing Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis 1988)). 
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spouse could obtain a divorce and result in such adverse conse-
quences as delayed child custody and support determinations. 84 
VI. FURTHERING THE POLICIES OF THE BRINKMAN DECISION 
389 
Brinkman seemed especially concerned that if it allowed Ms. Brink-
man to pursue her tort claim, she might be doubly compensated. Perhaps 
one of the best solutions to this potential problem is illustrated in Noble v. 
Noble. 85 In this case, the Mr. Noble shot his wife in the head at close range 
with a .22 caliber rifle. 86 Seven months later Mr. Noble filed a divorce ac-
tion.87 Ms. Noble counterclaimed for divorce alleging that Mr. Noble had 
left her unable to work because he had physically abused her. 88 She later 
filed a personal injury claim against her husband. 89 After the divorce de-
cree, Ms. Noble's tort claims were dismissed based upon principles of res 
judicata. 90 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah reversed the summary 
judgment that had dismissed Ms. Noble's tort claims. 91 The court stated, 
"Tort claims qua tort claims should not be tried as a part of a divorce ac-
tion.'m However, in determining the allocation of the Noble property, the 
trial court judge properly took into account Ms. Noble's medical expenses 
incurred as a result of the shooting.93 The court further stated that it did not 
matter that some of the facts considered in the divorce proceeding would 
also be considered in the tort proceeding.94 In order to avoid the problem 
of double recovery, the Supreme Court came up with a simple solution. It 
remanded the divorce case to the trial judge so that he could determine "to 
what precise extent the alimony and property awards are based on needs or 
disabilities arising from the shooting which could also be the basis for spe-
cial damages in tort, such as lost earning ability and medical expenses."95 
That amount would then be deducted from the damages she might later 
receive in her tort claim.96 
84. !d. at 1034. 
85 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988) 





91 !d. at 1375. 
92. !d. at 1374. 
93 !d. 
94 !d. at 1371. 
95. !d. at 1373. 
96. ld at 1375. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Res judicata has increasingly broadened and with that broadening we may 
expect to see more tort actions barred after divorce proceedings. However, 
because the policies behind letting a spouse pursue her action after a di-
vorce are so powerful, the Brinkman court, like the Nelson court should 
allow an exception to the res judicata rule. 
Rebekah B. Griffin 
